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543 
AN ANALYSIS OF WHETHER ALIENS SHOULD 
BE REQUIRED TO EXHAUST LOCAL REMEDIES 
BEFORE SUING IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER 
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
INTRODUCTION 
Human rights atrocities are too often committed in foreign nations 
against their own citizens. With the Alien Tort Statute, the United States 
has provided these foreign tort victims a forum in U.S. federal courts. 
However, implicit in the availability of a U.S. forum is the requirement 
that victims exhaust remedies available within the judicial systems of their 
native countries.  
In Part I of this Note, I explore the text of the Alien Tort Statute and 
similar statutes to glean Congress’s intent in offering U.S. federal courts as 
a potential forum for foreign tort victims. In Part II, I investigate the case 
law which has shaped and defined the Alien Tort Statute to determine how 
courts should interpret its text. In Part III, I look to case law which has 
required exhaustion. In Part IV, I examine the current controlling case 
evaluating an exhaustion requirement. Finally, in Part V, I discuss whether 
an exhaustion element should be required based on Parts I-IV of this Note. 
I conclude that exhaustion should be read into the text of the Alien Tort 
Statute. 
I. ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND RELATED STATUTES 
A. Alien Tort Statute 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) states that “district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”1 The ATS, therefore, grants jurisdiction2 to district courts to 
 
 
 1. Alien’s Action for Tort (“Alien Tort Statute” or “ATS”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 2. The Supreme Court held that the ATS did not create substantive law, but was a mere grant of 
jurisdiction. The Court looked to the placement of the ATS in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
which was “exclusively concerned with Federal-court jurisdiction” and to the common law at the time, 
which recognized alien tort claims. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713–14 (2004). Though 
the Court was inconclusive as to Congressional intent, it stated that the ATS was to take practical 
effect immediately, as opposed to waiting for a future statute to expressly authorize the cause of 
action, citing the first Congress’s anxiety regarding the laws of other nations. Id. at 714–20. 
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recognize claims by aliens for international law violations committed 
against them. The ATS was passed by the first Congress as part of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789.3 Although the ATS has been a part of American 
jurisprudence for centuries, little is known about Congress’s intent in 
enacting it.4 In fact, until recently, relatively few cases were brought under 
the ATS.5 As I discuss in greater detail in Part II.C of this Note, in 2004, 
the Supreme Court was given the opportunity to examine the ATS.6 The 
Court narrowed the ATS to apply only to claims “based on the present-day 
law of nations [that] rest on a norm of international character accepted by 
the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the 
features of the eighteenth century paradigms7 we have recognized.”8 It is 
important to keep this in mind and to remain faithful to the text of the ATS 
and its general scope while exploring an exhaustion requirement. 
B. Other Similar Statutes 
Human rights violations committed in foreign nations are primarily 
addressed in U.S. federal courts under three statutes: the ATS (the focus of 
this Note), the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), and the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Though there is virtually no evidence 
of Congress’s intent in creating the ATS, examining the language of these 
other statutes and Congress’s rationale for their enactment sheds some 
light on the purposes implicit in the ATS. The reasoning behind the 
creation of these other statutes also provides a better understanding of why 
an exhaustion element should be read into the text of the ATS.  
 
 
 3. The original text of the ATS stated that the “new federal district courts ‘shall also have 
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, 
of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.’” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712–13 (quoting Judiciary Act § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789)). 
 4. IIT v. Vencamp, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). The court stated that “[t]his old 
but little used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary 
Act, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), no one seems to know whence it came.” Id. 
 5. See id. (discussing the scarce number of cases finding jurisdiction under the ATS). See infra 
Part II, discussing major cases in the history of the ATS. 
 6. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712–18 (examining the text and history of the ATS).  
 7. These paradigms include “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy.” Id. at 724. 
 8. Id. at 725. 
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1. Torture Victim Protection Act 
In 1991, Congress enacted the TVPA9 to create an “unambiguous cause 
of action” for torture victims in foreign nations.10 Notably, the TVPA was 
codified in the historical notes section of the ATS and was not set apart as 
a separate statute.11 Thus, the TVPA could be construed as a portion of the 
ATS. The TVPA provides a remedy for aliens and U.S. citizens alike who 
were tortured in foreign nations.12 The TVPA contains both a statute of 
limitations and a requirement for the exhaustion of local remedies before 
an alien can sue in U.S. courts.13  
Congress enacted the TVPA to ensure victims of torture in foreign 
nations a cause of action in U.S. courts.14 However, Congress limited the 
recognition of such claims by requiring the exhaustion of local remedies.15 
A U.S. House of Representatives legislative report stated that, “[t]his 
requirement ensures that U.S. courts will not intrude in cases more 
 
 
 9. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”), Pub. L. No. 102-256 (1992) (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), historical and statutory notes). The TVPA states:  
Sec. 2. Establishment of civil action. 
(a) Liability.—An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any 
foreign nation— 
 (1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that 
individual; or 
 (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for 
damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an 
action for wrongful death. 
(b) Exhaustion of remedies.—A court shall decline to hear a claim under this section if the 
claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct 
giving rise to the claim occurred. 
(c) Statute of limitations.—No action shall be maintained under this section unless it is 
commenced within 10 years after the cause of action arose. 
Id. 
 10. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1091 (9th Cir. 2006). The court stated that “[t]he 
TVPA created an ‘unambiguous’ cause of action for official torture and extrajudicial killing—both 
violations of customary international law—committed outside the United States.” Id.  
 11. See TVPA, supra note 9. 
 12. See id. (using the term “individual” rather than limiting the availability of the statute only to 
foreign nationals). See also Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1092 (discussing the enactment of the TVPA). The Sarei 
Court stated that, “[u]nlike the AT[S], the TVPA is available to aliens and U.S. citizens.” Id. (“While 
the [ATS] provides a remedy to aliens only, the TVPA would extend a civil remedy also to U.S. 
citizens who may have been tortured abroad.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-367 at 4 (1991), reprinted in 
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86)).  
 13. See TVPA, supra note 9 (establishing the exhaustion and time limitations in sections (b) and 
(c) of the Act). 
 14. See Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1091–92 (discussing Congress’s rationale in creating the TVPA). 
 15. See TVPA, supra note 9 (stating expressly that TVPA claims cannot be brought before a U.S. 
court if the plaintiff has “not exhausted adequate and available remedies” in the country where the 
claim arose). 
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appropriately handled by courts where the alleged torture or killing 
occurred. It will also avoid exposing U.S. courts to unnecessary burdens, 
and can be expected to encourage the development of meaningful 
remedies in other countries.”16 These Congressional concerns apply 
equally to the ATS and strongly support implying exhaustion in the ATS. 
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
The FSIA17 also addresses human rights violations in foreign nations. 
For example, the FSIA provides that a foreign state is not immune from 
trials in U.S. courts when the foreign state has allowed or participated in 
terrorist acts.18 Congress included an exhaustion element in the text of the 
FSIA by requiring plaintiffs to afford the sovereign a “reasonable 
opportunity” to arbitrate the claim.19 
With little legislative history to reference regarding Congress’s intent 
in enacting the ATS, the analysis of these other, more recent statutes is 
revealing. While Congress did not expressly include an exhaustion 
element in the ATS, the requirement in the TVPA and other similar 
statutes suggests that an exhaustion element should be required when torts 
committed in other countries are tried in U.S. courts. Congressional 
concerns such as intrusion on adequate foreign forums, unnecessary 
burdens on U.S. courts, and development of remedies in foreign nations 
are equally relevant to ATS claims and support an exhaustion requirement. 
II. CASE HISTORY DEFINING THE ATS  
This section examines the case law that has shaped the contours of the 
ATS. Although the ATS was enacted in 1789, cases upholding jurisdiction 
 
 
 16. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1092 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-367 at 5, reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 87–88). 
 17. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et. seq. (2000).  
 18. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000). This section of the FSIA states that: 
not otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which money damages are sought against a 
foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial 
killing, support or resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for such an act is such 
act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such 
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency . . . . 
Id.  
 19. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(i) (2000). This provision of FSIA states that: 
the court shall decline to hear a claim under this paragraph . . . [if] (i) the act occurred in the 
foreign state against which the claim has been brought and the claimant has not afforded the 
foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted 
international rules of arbitration. Id. 
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under the ATS before 1960 are scarce.20 Historically, many courts did not 
take jurisdiction under the ATS because the defendant’s violations did not 
fall squarely within the “law of nations” language of the statute.21 Prior to 
1960, only one case upheld jurisdiction under the ATS.22 Blonchos v. 
Darrel,23 a case from 1795, involved a treaty violation, which allowed it to 
fit clearly into the text of the ATS. After Blonchos, cases have carefully 
evaluated the scope of the “law of nations” language in the ATS. This 
eventually led to the creation of the TVPA, which expressly requires 
exhaustion. The caution courts have historically taken to maintain the 
narrow scope of the ATS supports requiring exhaustion in ATS claims.  
A. IIT v. Vencamp, Ltd. 
In 1975, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the scope of 
the “law of nations” language of the ATS. In IIT v. Vencamp, Ltd.,24 the 
plaintiff, a Luxembourg investment trust, sued a Bahamian corporation for 
fraud, conversion, and corporate waste.25 Although the court admitted that 
virtually no legislative history existed regarding the ATS,26 it refused to 
assume that the “Eighth Commandment ‘Thou shalt not steal’ is part of the 
law of nations.”27 The court began narrowing and formulating a test to 
determine whether a claim violated the “law of nations” under the 
statute.28 The court stated that  
a violation of the law of nations arises only when there has been a 
“violation by one or more individuals of those standards, rules or 
customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an 
individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their 
common good and/or in dealings inter se.”29 
 
 
 20. IIT v. Vencamp, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussing the line of ATS cases 
leading up to this case). 
 21. See id.  
 22. See id. (listing the only case that the court could find prior to the current case upholding 
jurisdiction as Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers’ Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d. Cir. 1960)). 
 23. Blonchos v. Darrel, 3 F.Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795).  
 24. IIT, 519 F.2d 1001. 
 25. Id. at 1003. 
 26. See id. at 1015 (discussing how the ATS is a “legal Lohengrin”).  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. (quoting Lopez v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963)) 
(emphasis in original).  
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B. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 
In 1980, the Second Circuit again addressed the ATS, this time holding 
that torture violated the “law of nations” regarding human rights.30 This 
holding was codified in the TVPA in 1991. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,31 
the plaintiff’s32 son was tortured to death by the defendant, the Inspector 
General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay. The court looked to the U.S. 
Supreme Court for the “appropriate sources of international law.”33 The 
court stated that, “there are few, if any, issues in international law today on 
which opinion seems to be so united as the limitations on a state’s power 
to torture persons held in its custody.”34  
C. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
While these cases narrowed and defined the ATS, courts did not 
address whether an exhaustion requirement should be read into the ATS. 
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,35 the seminal case in ATS jurisprudence, the 
U.S. Supreme Court expressly chose not to address the exhaustion 
requirement.36 The Court instead disposed of the case by limiting the 
availability of the ATS to violations that fall under customary international 
law.37  
 
 
 30. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding jurisdiction over a 
torture claim brought by plaintiffs against an official of the Republic of Paraguay). 
 31. Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876. 
 32. The appellants were citizens of the Republic of Paraguay who had applied for permanent 
political asylum in the United States. Id. at 878. 
 33. Id. at 880. The court listed these appropriate sources, quoting the Supreme Court: “The law 
of nations ‘may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or 
by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that 
law.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820)).  
 34. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. 
 35. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 36. See id. at 733 n.21 (2004). The Sosa Court stated that the 
requirement of clear definition is not meant to be the only principle limiting the availability of 
relief in the federal courts for violations of customary international law, though it disposes of 
this action. For example, the European Commission argues as amicus curiae that basic 
principles of international law require that before asserting a claim in a foreign forum, the 
claimant must have exhausted any remedies available in the domestic legal system, and 
perhaps in other forums such as international claims tribunals. We would certainly consider 
this requirement in an appropriate case. 
Id. (citations omitted).  
 37. Id. at 733. The Court stated that the ATS claim must be gauged against the current state of 
international law, looking to those sources we have long, albeit cautiously, recognized.  
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, 
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to 
the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have 
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The Sosa plaintiff was a Mexican national who was indicted by a 
federal grand jury for torture and murder.38 Unable to apprehend the 
criminal, the Drug Enforcement Administration communicated with the 
Mexican government and hired Mexican nationals to seize the Sosa 
plaintiff and immediately bring him to the United States.39 The Mexican 
nationals apprehended the Sosa plaintiff from his home and kept him in 
custody for one night. The next day a private plane brought the Sosa 
plaintiff to the United States where he was promptly arrested by U.S. 
officials.40 The Supreme Court held that this did not constitute a violation 
of customary international law.41 
Though it did not directly address an exhaustion requirement, the 
Supreme Court’s ATS discussion is relevant to an exhaustion analysis. 
First, the Court held that the ATS is purely jurisdictional and does not 
create its own cause of action.42 However, the Court also held that at the 
time of its enactment, the ATS “enabled federal courts to hear claims in a 
very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at 
common law.”43  
Second, the Supreme Court chose to set a “high bar to new private 
causes of action for violating international law. . . .”44 In determining 
whether a plaintiff’s claim violates the “law of nations,” the Court advised 
 
 
made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works 
are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what 
the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.  
Id. at 733–34 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). 
 38. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697 (stating that the Sosa plaintiff was a Mexican physician who had 
used his medical skills to prolong the life of a man who was tortured in Guadalajara over a two-day 
period before being murdered. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California had issued 
a warrant for his arrest). 
 39. See id. at 698 (stating that the DEA entered into negotiations with the Mexican Government 
for assistance in the arrest, but when those failed, it hired Mexican nationals to bring the Sosa plaintiff 
into the United States). 
 40. See id. (stating that after being abducted, the Sosa plaintiff was merely held overnight in a 
motel before being flown to El Paso, Texas, where he was arrested by federal officers). 
 41. See id. at 738 (holding that a “single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the 
transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary 
international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy”). 
 42. See id. at 712 (stating that “we agree the statute is in terms only jurisdictional”). The Court 
went on to hold that 
although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action, the reasonable 
inference from the historical materials is that the statute was intended to have practical effect 
the moment it became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the 
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number 
of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time. 
Id. at 724. 
 43. Id. at 712. 
 44. Id. at 727. 
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a “restrained conception of the discretion a federal court should exercise in 
considering a new cause of action” under the ATS.45 The Court 
recommended that district courts use “judicial caution” when interpreting 
a plaintiff’s claim as violating customary international laws.46 The Court’s 
rationale for these admonitions include changes in common law,47 the role 
of federal courts in creating common law,48 the preference for the 
legislature to create private rights of action,49 current foreign relation 
implications,50 and the lack of a congressional mandate for judicial 
creativity.51 The Court stated that the above reasons “argue for great 
caution in adapting the law of nations to private rights.”52  
Notably, the Court did not want to completely “close the door to 
further independent judicial recognition of actionable international norms 
. . . .”53 The Court recognized that federal courts should be able to 
“properly identify some international norms as enforceable . . . .”54 The 
Court went on to state that Congress affirmed judicial creation of 
 
 
 45. Id. at 725. 
 46. Id. at 729. The Court argued for “great caution in adapting the law of nations to private 
rights.” Id. at 728. 
 47. See id. at 725 (stating that courts now recognize that common law is “not so much found or 
discovered as it is either made or created.” This change “counsels restraint in judicially applying 
internationally generated norms.”).  
 48. See id. at 726 (stating that the Erie doctrine led to the “general practice” that courts should 
“look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority over substantive law”). 
 49. See id. at 727 (stating that “this Court has recently and repeatedly said that a decision to 
create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of cases”). 
The Court went on suggest that “[w]hile the absence of congressional action addressing private rights 
of action under an international norm is more equivocal than its failure to provide such a right when it 
creates a statute, the possible collateral consequences of making international rules privately actionable 
argue for judicial caution.” Id.  
 50. See id. at 728 (insisting that “new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse 
foreign policy consequences”). In addition, the Court stated that  
[i]t is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional limits on our own State and 
Federal Governments’ power, but quite another to consider suits under rules that would go so 
far as to claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and to 
hold that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed those limits. 
Id. at 727. 
 51. Id. at 728 (understanding that “[w]e have no congressional mandate to seek out and define 
new and debatable violations of the law of nations, and modern indications of congressional 
understanding of the judicial role in the field have not affirmatively encouraged greater judicial 
creativity”). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 729. The Court went on to state that “judicial power should be exercised on the 
understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class 
of international norms today.” Id.  
 54. Id. at 730. The Court looked to the first Congress and the framers of the Constitution who 
used the ATS to show that the United States recognized the law of nations. The Court also stated that 
the ATS “was enacted on the congressional understanding that courts would exercise jurisdiction by 
entertaining some common law claims derived from the law of nations . . . .” Id. at 731 n.19. 
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international norms with the enactment of the TVPA.55 Thus, the Supreme 
Court sought to allow district courts some discretion in determining 
whether an ATS claim should be sustained. However, the Court advised 
caution and warned that an enactment of Congress would alter judicial 
decisions.56 
The Court concluded by determining the test for assessing whether a 
claim violates the “law of nations.”57 The Court held that ATS claims 
should only arise from torts that violate “historical paradigms” of 
international law.58 Though the Supreme Court avoided examining an 
exhaustion requirement, their warning to lower courts to limit ATS claims, 
while not closing the door on judicial discretion, supports implying 
exhaustion into the ATS.  
III. CASES REQUIRING EXHAUSTION  
While the above cases began defining the ATS, none of them directly 
addressed whether the exhaustion of local remedies should be read into the 
text of the ATS. This section explores international human rights cases 
expressly requiring exhaustion, though not based on the text of the ATS. 
Most of the following cases based dismissal on forum non conveniens, 
which involves a similar analysis to exhaustion. 
Courts dismiss actions on forum non conveniens grounds when an 
action would be more properly brought in another forum.59 The analysis is 
virtually identical to what courts use when determining whether an 
exhaustion requirement has been satisfied. Therefore, these cases are 
useful in analyzing an ATS exhaustion requirement. 
 
 
 55. See id. at 731 (“Congress, however, has not only expressed no disagreement with our view of 
the proper exercise of judicial power, but has responded to its most notable instance by enacting 
legislation supplementing the judicial determination in some detail.”). 
 56. Id. at 731–32 (“It is enough to say that Congress may . . . modify or cancel any judicial 
decision so far as it rests on recognizing an international norm as such.”). 
 57. See id. at 731 (setting forth the standard for assessing claims under the ATS).  
 58. Id. at 732. The Court held that “federal courts should not recognize private claims under 
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and 
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was 
enacted.” Id. 
 59. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“The doctrine that an appropriate forum—
even though competent under the law—may divest itself of jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the 
litigants and the witnesses, it appears that the action should proceed in another forum in which the 
action might also have been properly brought in the first place.”). The forum non conveniens doctrine 
“permits a court to dismiss a claim, ‘even if the court is a permissible venue with proper jurisdiction 
over the claim’, in order to allow the action to be tried elsewhere for the convenience of litigants and 
witnesses.” Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 335 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
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A. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. 
In Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.,60 the Second Circuit did not address the 
plaintiffs’ ATS claims but remanded the case on forum non conveniens 
grounds for a determination of whether an “adequate alternative forum” 
exists.61 In this case, Nigerian parents claimed that the biotech firm, Pfizer, 
used experimental antibiotics on their children during a meningitis 
outbreak in Nigeria.62 The parents claimed that Pfizer failed to obtain 
informed consent before administering the experimental treatment and that 
as a result, their children were seriously injured or died.63 The court 
analyzed the plaintiffs’ ability to obtain justice in the foreign forum64 and 
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether a Nigerian 
case dismissed by Nigerian courts precluded the plaintiffs from obtaining 
justice.65 Although the court did not determine whether the plaintiffs’ 
claims were cognizable under the ATS, the application of the Abdullahi 
alternative forum analysis ultimately led to dismissal on forum non 
conveniens grounds.66 
 
 
 60. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 77 Fed. Appx. 48 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 61. Id. at 51–53. The Court considered the following three factors for forum non conveniens 
analysis: “(i) the level of deference owed to the plaintiffs; (ii) the availability of an adequate 
alternative forum; and (iii) whether the public and private interest factors weigh in favor of an 
adjudication in the plaintiffs’ chosen forum or in the defendant’s proposed alternative.” Id. at 51 
(citing Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488, 500 (2d Cir. 
2002)). 
 62. See id. at 51 (stating that Pfizer, the world’s largest pharmaceutical corporation, had 
established a treatment center in Nigeria during a meningitis epidemic where, plaintiff’s claim, it was 
conducting biomedical research experiments by using a new antibiotic on Nigerian children).  
 63. See id. at 51 (claiming that Pfizer failed to notify the parents of more conventional free 
treatments and that, as a result of the treatment, many of the children suffered death or serious injuries 
including paralysis, deafness, and blindness). 
 64. The court stated that in most cases “an alternative forum is ordinarily adequate if the 
defendants are amenable to service of process there and the forum permits litigation of the subject 
matter of the dispute.” Id. at 52 (citations omitted). However, the court went on the describe that “[i]n 
rare cases . . . if the plaintiff shows that conditions in the foreign forum plainly demonstrate that 
plaintiffs are highly unlikely to obtain basic justice therein, a defendant’s forum non conveniens 
motion must be denied.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 65. See id. (examining the plaintiff’s claim that the Nigerian court system was corrupt and that a 
parallel action was dismissed by Nigerian courts, and finding that there was insufficient specific 
information to make a determination). When evaluating the plaintiff’s claims of corruption in the 
Nigerian court system, the court stated that “conclusory allegations of corruption or bias on the part of 
the foreign forum will not prevent a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.” Id. (citations 
omitted).  
 66. The court ultimately granted Pfizer’s motion to dismiss, holding that the claim did not 
implicate sufficient international law violations to fall within the ATS. Additionally, the court held that 
Nigeria was an adequate forum for the case and therefore the case was dismissed on forum non 
conveniens grounds. Adamu v. Pfizer, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 495, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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B. Adamu v. Pfizer, Inc. 
Adamu v. Pfizer, Inc.,67 a companion case to Abdullahi,68 is based on 
the same facts as and similar claims to those in Abdullahi.69 As it did with 
the Abdullahi decision,70 the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on 
forum non conveniens grounds, as well as under the ATS, and held that 
choice of law favors Nigerian law.71  
The court first looked at the ATS to determine whether it had 
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. In holding that it did not, the court 
analyzed whether the plaintiff’s claim “adequately plead[ed] a violation of 
international law.”72 The court determined that the law of nations does not 
“prescribe a remedy” and therefore, medical experimentation does not 
violate the “law of nations.”73 The court went on to declare that, 
“[w]hether and how the United States reacts to violations of international 
law are domestic questions that determine if a cause of action exists.”74 
Therefore, in determining international law norms, courts look to whether 
the local nation provides a remedy. 
The court also determined that the case could be dismissed on forum 
non conveniens grounds.75 The court stated that “[d]ismissal is appropriate 
where ‘the balance of convenience tilts strongly in favor of trial in the 
 
 
 67. Adamu, 399 F. Supp. 2d 495. 
 68. See id. at 497 n.1 (stating that Abdullahi was a “related action involving the same underlying 
facts”). 
 69. Id. at 498. The court explained more thoroughly the atrocities committed by Pfizer. The court 
explained how Pfizer, without the consent of the parents, separated the Nigerian children into two 
groups for medical experimentation of the drug Trovan. In order to enhance the results of Trovan, 
Pfizer administered the control group only one-third of the recommended dose of the control drug, 
Ceftriaxone. Once the drugs were administered, Pfizer failed to regularly analyze the patients’ blood 
tests, a standard practice in drug testing, allowing the patients’ side effects to become permanent 
before recording them. Furthermore, Pfizer left after two weeks of testing without any follow-up tests. 
Both children given the experimental drug and the intentionally underdosed control drug suffered 
death or serious injury. Id. 
 70. The court stated that it “incorporates the facts and rationales of the decisions in [Abdullahi].” 
Id. at 497 n.1. 
 71. See id. at 506 (discussing the alternative grounds for dismissing the plaintiff’s claims). 
 72. Id. at 500.  
 73. Id. at 501. The court stated that the “law of nations does not itself create a right of action 
because it does not prescribe a remedy.” Id.  
 74. Id. (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d. Cir. 1995)). In Kadic, the court stated 
that “[t]he law of nations generally does not create private causes of action to remedy its violations, 
but leaves to each nation the task of defining the remedies that are available for international law 
violations.” Id. 
 75. See Adamu v. Pfizer, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 495, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting Pfizer’s 
motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens). 
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foreign forum.’”76 The court found that Nigeria was an adequate forum77 
and that both public and private interest factors weighed in favor of the 
trial taking place in Nigeria.78 Public interest factors included congestion 
in the local courts, the unfairness of imposing jury duty on a forum with 
no relation to the action, the interest of the other country in having matters 
considered in its own forum, and the desire to avoid problems arising from 
the application of foreign law and conflict of laws rules.79 Private interest 
factors included the forum’s access to evidence and witnesses,80 the 
“availability of compulsory process,” and the costs and length of 
litigation.81 Not only did the court hold that, in this case, Nigeria was the 
more appropriate forum, but it also stated that, “[p]laintiffs’ choice of 
forum is not entitled to a greater deference because they have alleged 
international law violations.”82  
These forum non conveniens factors would be similar to those 
considered for exhaustion under the ATS. Furthermore, the understanding 
that plaintiffs are not given greater deference due to international law 
violations in their home country supports a finding that exhaustion should 
be required in ATS cases. 
The court also determined that Nigerian law was proper under a 
conflict of laws analysis.83 Though the conclusion that Nigerian law 
governs the litigation is insufficient to determine that an adequate forum 
 
 
 76. Id. at 504 (quoting R. Maganlal & Co. v. M.G. Chem. Co., 942 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 
1991)). The court explained the test for forum non conviens:  
First, the defendant must demonstrate the existence of an adequate alternative forum. If an 
adequate forum is available, the court then considers the public and private interest factors set 
forth in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947), and its progeny . . . . Based 
on those factors, a court examines whether a trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum would create 
oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s 
convenience, or whether the chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations 
affecting the court’s own administrative and legal problems. After considering the private 
interest factors concerning the convenience of the litigants and public interest factors 
affecting the convenience of the forum, a court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, 
dismiss the case. 
Id. (citations omitted) (second alteration in original).  
 77. The court set the adequate forum standard at “rare circumstances where the potential 
difficulties of the foreign forum render the remedy offered by that forum clearly unsatisfactory.” Id. 
(citations omitted). 
 78. See id. at 504–06 (holding that the private and public interest factors weigh in favor of 
dismissing the action).  
 79. Id. at 504 (listing the Gilbert public interest factors). 
 80. Notably, much of the evidence and witnesses were located at Pfizer’s headquarters in 
Connecticut. Id. at 505–06. 
 81. Id. at 505 (listing the Gilbert private interest factors). 
 82. Id. at 505 n.6. 
 83. See id. at 503 (stating that “Nigerian—not Connecticut—substantive law governs”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/5
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] EXHAUST LOCAL REMEDIES BEFORE SUING IN THE U.S. 555 
 
 
 
 
exists in Nigeria, it is probative. The Nigerian judges’ expertise in the laws 
of Nigeria benefited the litigants. Here there was “no dispute that Nigerian 
law affords redress for Plaintiffs’ claims.”84 The court looked to tort law 
doctrines85 to find that the best forum “has the most significant 
relationship to the occurrence and the parties.”86 Factors relevant to the 
court’s decision included the interests and reasonable expectations of the 
international judicial systems, policies relevant to the field of law, and 
difficulties in applying the law.87 The court also examined factors relevant 
to contacts with the forum. These included where the injuries took place, 
where the improper actions of the defendant took place, where the 
plaintiffs and defendants reside, and where the parties’ relationship was 
centered.88 The court ultimately applied Nigerian law “because the 
Nigerian contacts to this litigation are stronger than Connecticut’s.”89 
Because ATS cases concern violations against foreign nationals in their 
home countries, the factors for determining choice of law are also useful in 
determining whether an exhaustion element should be satisfied in ATS 
claims.  
 
 
 84. Id. at 501. 
 85. The court first examined the lex loci delicti doctrine, which states that the “substantive rights 
and obligations arising out of a tort controversy are determined by the law of the place of injury.” Id. at 
502 (quoting O’Connor v. O’Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 15 (Conn. 1986)). However, the court also stated 
that it would not apply the doctrine where the “strict application of lex loci delicti would frustrate ‘the 
legitmate expections of the parties’ or undermine ‘an important policy of this state . . . .’” Id.  
 86. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1969)). 
 87. The court relied on the Restatement, which provides the “factors relevant to the choice of the 
applicable rule of law . . . .” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6). These 
factors include:  
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,  
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,  
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in 
the determination of the particular issue,  
(d) the protection of justified expectations,  
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,  
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and  
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
Id. 
 88. Id. at 503.  
 89. Id. 
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C. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.  
In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,90 the district 
court held that the foreign forum was inadequate under forum non 
conveniens and determined that the case would remain in U.S. federal 
courts under the ATS.91 Here, an energy company92 “collaborated with 
Sudan in ‘ethnically cleansing’93 civilian populations surrounding oil 
concessions located in southern Sudan in order to facilitate oil exploration 
and extraction activities.”94 The court found all of the plaintiffs’ claims 
valid under the ATS95 before turning to a forum non conveniens analysis. 
The court proceeded to conclude that Sudan was not a viable 
alternative forum for the plaintiffs’ claims.96 The court looked at whether 
an adequate alternative forum existed.97 The court considered the opinions 
of experts on Sudanese law98 and the “self-evident fact that, if plaintiffs’ 
 
 
 90. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003).  
 91. The court also analyzed whether a corporation’s activities in a foreign forum could be 
brought under an ATS claim. Id. at 308. The court held that “a considerable body of United States and 
international precedent indicates that corporations may be liable for violations of international law, 
particularly when their actions constitute jus cogens violations.” Id. 
 92. Talisman was the “largest independent Canadian oil producer” with “operations in Canada, 
the United States, the North Sea, Indonesia, Algeria, Trinidad, Colombia, and Sudan.” Id. at 299–300.  
 93. “This policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ was aimed at non-Muslim, African residents of southern 
Sudan, and entailed extrajudicial killing, forced displacement, military attacks on civilian targets, 
confiscation and destruction of property, kidnappings, rape, and the enslavement of civilians.” Id. at 
296. 
 94. Id.  
 95. After determining that a private corporation could be held liable under the ATS, the court 
examined whether the plaintiffs’ claims fell under the “law of nations.” The court held that conspiracy 
and aiding and abetting were actionable. Id. at 320. The court held that torture was also actionable 
provided the “plaintiffs can show that these acts were committed for any reason based on 
discrimination and with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.” Id. at 326. Slavery, war crimes, and (in this case) treatment of ethnic and religious 
minorities, were all held to be violations of the laws of nations. Id. at 326–27. The court went on to 
address the plaintiffs’ standing as individuals and as a class to assert the ATS claims. Id. at 331–35. 
 96. See id. at 336 (finding that “Sudan is not an appropriate forum under forum non conveniens 
analysis”). 
 97. See id. at 336 (stating that a forum non conveniens assessment requires a two-step test). For 
this test, “the court must [first] determine whether an adequate alternative forum exists. Second, if 
such a forum exists, the court must undertake a balancing test and weigh several factors involving the 
private interests of the parties and the public interests at stake.” Id. The court stated that “the burden is 
on the defendant to show that the factors tilt ‘strongly’ in favor of trial in a foreign forum.” Id. 
(quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 98. The energy company’s expert outlined the “detail[ed] procedures and jurisprudence of the 
Sudanese judicial system,” but failed to indicate whether “the Sudanese judicial system is fair and free 
from corruption.” Id. The plaintiffs’ expert stated that “plaintiffs, who are non-Muslims, enjoy greatly 
reduced rights in Sudan under the system of Islamic law” and concluded that “the trial of this case in 
Sudan will result in a total failure of justice.” Id. at 335–36 (citations omitted).  
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allegations are true, plaintiffs would be unable to obtain justice in Sudan 
and might well expose themselves to great danger in trying to do so 
. . . .”99 Thus, in determining whether the plaintiffs should sue in the 
foreign forum, the court used the plaintiffs’ allegations of governmental 
atrocities to support its finding that the foreign forum was inadequate. 
D. Ehanhoro v. Abubakar 
In Ehanhoro v. Abubakar,100 the Seventh Circuit remanded the 
plaintiffs’ ATS action, commanding that the suit instead be brought under 
the TVPA and that the exhaustion requirement be met.101 In this case, 
Nigerians sued the former head of state of Nigeria for human rights 
violations including murder and torture.102 The court began its analysis by 
deciding it had jurisdiction over the claim103 and then turned to examine 
the ATS.104 The court held that the plaintiffs’ claims should be brought 
 
 
 99. Id. at 336. The court stated that it would be “rather surprising if the government of Sudan 
conducted a war of ‘ethnic cleansing’ against plaintiffs and at the same time granted them a fair 
judicial process to remedy those injuries.” Id. The court also surmised that “it would be perverse, to 
say the least, to require plaintiffs to bring this suit in the courts of the very nation that has allegedly 
been conducting genocidal activities to try to eliminate them.” Id. The court then quoted a prior case, 
stating that:  
[o]ne of the difficulties that confront victims of torture under color of a nation’s law is the 
enormous difficulty of bringing suits to vindicate such abuses. Most likely, the victims cannot 
sue in the place where the torture occurred. Indeed, in many instances, the victim would be 
endangered merely by returning to that place. It is not easy to bring such suits in the courts of 
another nation. Courts are often inhospitable. Such suits are generally time consuming, 
burdensome, and difficult to administer. In addition, because they assert outrageous conduct 
on the part of another nation, such suits may embarrass the government of the nation in whose 
courts they are brought. Finally, because characteristically neither the plaintiffs nor the 
defendants are ostensibly either protected or governed by the domestic law of the forum 
nation, courts often regard such suits as ‘not our business.’ 
 Id. (quoting Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 106). 
 100. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 101. See id. at 886 (stating that “[w]e will remand this case to the district court for a determination 
regarding whether the plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaint to state [a TVPA] claim 
and, if they do, whether, in fact, the exhaustion requirement in the [TVPA] defeats their claim”). 
 102. Id. at 878–79. The plaintiffs alleged that during a period of civil unrest ranging from 1983 
until 1999, one of the highest ranking military and political officials in Nigeria murdered or tortured 
the plaintiffs’ political activist family members. Id. at 879–80. The plaintiffs’ complaint stated “seven 
claims: torture; arbitrary detention; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; false imprisonment; 
assault and battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and wrongful death.” Id. at 880.  
 103. See id. (“The preliminary issue is whether we have appellate jurisdiction over the appeal. We 
conclude that we do.”).  
 104. The court provided a broad post-Sosa analysis of the ATS, discussing Sosa and whether the 
plaintiffs’ claims fell under the “law of nations” language of the ATS. Id. at 883–84. 
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under the TVPA because Congress created an express cause of action 
under that statute.105  
Before concluding that the claim was more properly brought under the 
TVPA, the court addressed whether a plaintiff had a choice of suing under 
it or the ATS.106 The court held that a plaintiff could not simply plead 
under the ATS rather than the TVPA to avoid the exhaustion 
requirement.107 Allowing the plaintiff to make this choice would render the 
TVPA “meaningless.”108 The court went on to state that exhaustion might 
be a “basic principle of international law”109 and held that the plaintiffs 
made no showing that they exhausted their remedies in Nigeria.110 
Therefore, the case was ultimately remanded to the district courts,111 
which placed the exhaustion burden firmly on the plaintiffs.112  
IV. SAREI V. RIO TINTO, PLC: EXPRESSLY ADDRESSING WHETHER AN 
EXHAUSTION ELEMENT SHOULD BE REQUIRED 
In early August of 2006, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,113 the Ninth Circuit 
directly addressed whether federal courts should require exhaustion in 
ATS claims. The court held that the ATS’s legislative history, the 
language of the ATS, the Supreme Court’s statements in Sosa, and overall 
 
 
 105. See id. at 886. (“It is hard to imagine that the Sosa Court would approve of common law 
claims based on torture and extrajudicial killing when Congress has specifically provided a cause of 
action for those violations and has set out how those claims must proceed. As relevant to this case, 
then, the ATS would provide jurisdiction over a suit . . . for violations of the [TVPA].”).  
 106. See id. at 884 (“The issue, then, becomes whether both [the TVPA and the ATS] can 
simultaneously exist to provide content to the ATS. In other words, does the [TVPA] occupy the field 
or could a plaintiff plead under the Act and/or under the common law?”). 
 107. See id. at 884–85.  
 108. Id. at 885 (“No one would plead a cause of action under the [TVPA] and subject himself to 
its requirements if he could simply plead under international law.”). The court quoted the Supreme 
Court, which stated that “legislative history says that § 1350 should ‘remain intact to permit suits 
based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international 
law,’ but the Court said Congress had done nothing to promote other such suits.” Id. (quoting Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 697, 728 (2004)).  
 109. Id. at 886.  
 110. See id. (noting that “nothing in the record indicates that they have exhausted their remedies”).  
 111. There has currently been no ruling in the District Court.  
 112. It is also interesting to note that the court began its discussion of the case with the following: 
A courtroom in Chicago, one would think, is an unlikely place for considering a case 
involving seven Nigerian citizens suing an eighth Nigerian for acts committed in Nigeria. It 
sounds like the sort of fare that would be heard in a courtroom on the African continent. But 
this case ended up in Chicago, and that leads us to consider the claims of seven Nigerian 
citizens against a Nigerian general over alleged torture and murder in Nigeria. The path the 
plaintiffs are pursuing is, as we shall see, quite thorny. 
Id. at 878–79. 
 113. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006).  
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policy concerns weighed in favor of not requiring an exhaustion 
element.114 Instead of reading an exhaustion element into the ATS, the 
majority preferred to “leav[e] it to Congress or the Supreme Court to take 
the next step, if warranted.”115 However, in a lengthy dissent, Circuit 
Judge Bybee also looked to the statutory language, the legislative history 
of the TVPA, international and domestic legal norms, and policy concerns 
to determine that an exhaustion element should be included.116 Although 
the arguments on both sides are formidable, I believe the majority got this 
close call wrong and that an exhaustion requirement should be read into 
the text of the ATS. Congressional intent, the Supreme Court’s cautionary 
advice, forum non conveniens analysis, and the basic principles of 
international law support requiring exhaustion before bringing an ATS 
claim. 
The Sarei plaintiffs were residents of Papau New Guinea.117 They 
claimed to be victims of international law violations118 that occurred 
during a civil conflict following an uprising at the defendant, Rio Tinto’s, 
mine.119 The court first held that the plaintiffs suffered violations of 
international legal norms sufficient to constitute an ATS claim.120 The 
court then determined that the plaintiffs’ claims did not present 
“nonjusticiable political questions.”121 The third step in the court’s 
 
 
 114. See id. (discussing the rationale for not reading an exhaustion element into the ATS). 
 115. Id. at 1099. 
 116. See id. at 1100–22 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (discussing the rationale for including an 
exhaustion requirement). 
 117. Id. at 1073–74. 
 118. The plaintiffs’ claims included “racial discrimination, environmental devastation, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, with severe repercussions for many citizens of PNG.” Id. at 1074. 
 119. Id. Rio Tinto had a deal with the Papau New Guinea (PNG) government to provide 19.1% of 
the mine’s profits in exchange for the government’s assistance. Id. at 1075. The plaintiffs alleged that 
the waste products from Rio Tinto’s mining polluted waterways and undermined their physical and 
mental health. Id. The plaintiffs also claimed that they were paid lower wages because they were black 
and were forced to live in “slave-like” conditions. Id. When the citizens engaged in an uprising, Rio 
Tinto sought the aid of the PNG government, which led to an army attack and, subsequently, ten years 
of civil war ensued. Id. During this time of civil unrest, PNG at the request of Rio Tinto, burnt 
villages, raped citizens, and conducted aerial bombardments of civilian targets, among other atrocities. 
Id. These acts resulted in death and health problems and forced many to flee or live in refugee camps. 
Id. 
 120. See id. at 1077–78 (examining the claims under the ATS). The court stated that “We . . . 
agree with the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ claims for war crimes, violations of the 
laws of war, [and] racial discrimination . . . all implicate ‘specific, universal and obligatory norm[s] of 
international law’ that properly form the basis for [ATS] claims.” Id. at 1078 (quoting Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2002)) (first alteration in original). The court also 
stated that “[a]ll of the plaintiff’s remaining claims . . . assert jus cogens violations that form the least 
controversial core of modern day [ATS] jurisdiction.” Id. 
 121. Id. at 1083. The court stated that the political question doctrine was a “function of the 
separation of powers, and set forth six factors that require the dismissal of a suit under the political 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
560 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:543 
 
 
 
 
analysis examined the act-of-state doctrine.122 The court overturned the 
district court’s judgment in part and remanded in part based only on the 
act-of-state doctrine.123 Fourth, the court determined that the district 
court’s international comity doctrine124 ruling should be vacated.125 Lastly, 
the court turned to the analysis of an exhaustion requirement in the 
ATS.126 
The court began its ATS exhaustion analysis by looking at judicial 
precedent, under which the exhaustion “question [was] far from settled.”127 
Turning to Congressional intent,128 the court stated that “[t]here is 
 
 
question doctrine.” Id. at 1079 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). In holding that the 
political question doctrine was not violated, the court addressed whether the issue is constitutionally 
committed to another branch of government and if review of the issue interfered with a coordinate 
branch. Id. at 1079–84.  
 122. The act-of-state doctrine “prevents U.S. courts from inquiring into the validity of the public 
acts of a recognized sovereign power committed within its own territory.” Id. at 1084. The rationale 
for the doctrine seeks to avoid interference with “American foreign policy.” Id. The court applies a 
two factor test for determining whether an action should be barred by the act-of-state doctrine. Id. This 
test determines: “(1) if there is an official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory; 
and (2) the relief sought or the defense interposed [in the action would require] a court in the United 
States to declare invalid the [foreign sovereign’s] official act.” Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in 
original). However, even when the two-step test is met, courts can still “choose not to apply the 
[doctrine] where the policies underlying the doctrine militate against its application.” Id. These 
policies include (a) the “degree of codification” which makes it more appropriate for judiciary review; 
(b) the less important the issue is for U.S. foreign relations, the more appropriate it is for the courts; 
and (c) whether the “government which perpetrated the challenged act of state” no longer exists. Id.  
 123. See id. at 1084–86 (reviewing the district court’s determinations based on the act-of-state 
doctrine). The court held that the alleged racial discrimination “cannot constitute official sovereign 
acts” because “[i]nternational law does not recognize an act that violates jus cogens as a sovereign 
act.” Id. at 1085 (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718 (Cal. 1992)). 
The court then looked to UNCLOS violations and remanded the issue to district court, stating that 
“[t]he district court’s application of the [Act of State Doctrine] relied in part on the SOI’s assertion 
regarding the potential impact of this case on United States foreign relations,” which the circuit court 
has rejected. Id. at 1086.  
 124. “Under the international comity doctrine, courts sometimes defer to the laws or interests of a 
foreign country and decline to exercise jurisdiction that is otherwise properly asserted.” Id. Comity 
analysis turns on whether a true conflict of law exists between domestic and foreign law. See id. at 
1087 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993)). 
 125. See id. at 1088–89 (stating that the district court’s ruling to decline to hear the plaintiff’s 
racial discrimination and UNCLOS claims on comity grounds should be vacated “for reconsideration 
in light of [the Circuit Court’s] analysis of the SOI”).  
 126. Id. at 1089. 
 127. Id. at 1090 (citing Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 890 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., 
dissenting in part)). The court looked to the Sosa Court’s punting of the issue to an “appropriate case.” 
Id. at 1089 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004)). The court stated that 
“even if exhaustion were to apply to the [ATS], local remedies would in those cases be futile and 
therefore need not be exhausted.” Id. (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Ltd., 
244 F. Supp. 3d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), and Enahoro, 408 F.3d 877).  
 128. The court stated that “[c]ongressional intent is of ‘paramount importance’ to any exhaustion 
inquiry.” Id. at 1090 (quoting Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982)). However, courts 
have discretion to require exhaustion “[w]hen Congress has not clearly required” it and when policy 
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complete silence in the [ATS’s] legislative history.”129 In contrast, the Jay 
Treaty,130 passed five years after the ATS, incorporated a rule similar to 
exhaustion.131 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the first Congress 
was aware of and could have incorporated an exhaustion element into the 
ATS, but did not do so, the absence of an exhaustion requirement was 
intentional.132  
The court next looked to the TVPA for guidance.133 Although Congress 
did not explicitly discuss the addition of exhaustion to the ATS when 
creating the TVPA, Congress did state that the ATS “should not be 
replaced” by the TVPA.134 The court reasoned that Congress would not 
incorporate a “superfluous exhaustion provision [in]to the TVPA” if one 
already existed in the ATS.135 Furthermore, Congress determined that 
torture victims would not have difficulty proving exhaustion.136 The court 
concluded that legislative intent was “unclear” and did not support 
importing an exhaustion requirement into the ATS because Congressional 
intent was not “express” enough.137  
 
 
considerations are consistent with congressional intent. Id. (citations omitted).  
 129. Id. at 1091 (citing ITT v. Vencamp, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)).  
 130. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-U.K., art. IV, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116, 
119 [hereinafter Jay Treaty]. 
 131. See Sarei, 456 F.2d at 1091. (describing the Jay Treaty’s arbitration procedure for pre-
Revolutionary War debts claimed by British creditors against American debtors). The arbitration 
procedure could not be invoked unless “by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the British 
creditors cannot now obtain, and actually have and receive full and adequate compensation.” Id. 
(quoting Jay Treaty).  
 132. See id. (stating that the Jay Treaty incorporated an exhaustion-like requirement). The court 
further stated that “the explicit exhaustion requirement in the Jay Treaty may reveal that the First 
Congress did not view exhaustion as an automatic rule of customary international law . . . .” Id.  
 133. See id. at 1091–94 (discussing Congress’s intent in incorporating an exhaustion requirement 
into the TVPA and not the ATS).  
 134. Id. at 1092 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 
86). Congress also stated that the ATS “should remain intact.” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 5).  
 135. Id. at 1093. 
 136. See id. (discussing how Congress “tailor-made” the TVPA “with those substantive 
international law violations in mind . . . ”). Congress stated that “in most instances the initiation of 
litigation under [the TVPA] will be virtually prima facie evidence that the claimant has exhausted his 
or her remedies in the jurisdiction in which the torture occurred.” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 
9–10).  
 137. Id. at 1094. The Court stated that  
given (i) the lack of express historical or contemporary congressional intent regarding 
exhaustion under the [ATS], (ii) Congress’ recent pronouncement that the [ATS] should 
remain ‘intact’ and ‘unchanged’ and (iii) Congress’ specific focus in the TVPA on torture and 
extrajudicial killing, we cannot conclude that legislative intent supports importing an 
exhaustion requirement into the [ATS]. 
Id. 
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The court then held that judges should not have discretion to import an 
exhaustion requirement into the ATS.138 The court stated that although 
exhaustion is a “norm within international human rights law,” it does “not 
compel a U.S. court to apply it in an [ATS] cause of action.”139 The court 
reasoned that exhaustion is only a norm “developed specifically within the 
context of international tribunals . . . .”140 The court held that norms of 
international tribunals did not apply when, as in the ATS, a domestic court 
adjudicates international law violations in a civil suit.141 
The court also examined the language of the ATS to determine that the 
“law of nations” does not require exhaustion because it is “procedural 
rather than substantive.”142 The court relied on Sosa, stating that because 
the ATS does not create a cause of action, courts must look to common 
law for substantive international law violations.143 The court went on to 
conclude that exhaustion, a procedural norm, should not be applied to the 
ATS because “[t]he Supreme Court has not addressed whether the 
methodology it employed in Sosa to identify some substantive 
international norms as falling within the [ATS’s] jurisdictional grant is 
applicable to procedural and other nonsubstantive customary law 
norms.”144 
Finally, the court examined policy rationales for excluding an 
exhaustion requirement from the ATS.145 Initially, the court determined 
that requiring plaintiffs to exhaust local remedies was unlikely to improve 
human rights by improving local legal systems.146 The court cited a lack of 
empirical evidence of such improvements.147 Conversely, not requiring 
 
 
 138. Id. (emphasis in original). See also id. at 1095–99 (analyzing international law norms, the 
language of the ATS, and policy rationales for and against requiring exhaustion and determining that 
the “balance tips against judicially engrafting an exhaustion requirement onto a statute where Congress 
has declined to do so . . .”).  
 139. Id. at 1096 (emphasis in original).  
 140. Id.  
 141. See id. (stating that “the exhaustion limitation imposed on and accepted by international 
tribunals as a requirement of international law is not dispositive as to a United States court’s discretion 
to impose exhaustion as part of the [ATS]”) (emphasis in original). 
 142. Id. at 1096–97. 
 143. See id. at 1097 (discussing the Sosa Court’s holding that the ATS is purely a jurisdictional 
statute and that “[t]he exhaustion rule is not like any . . . modern substantive equivalents such as 
torture, extrajudicial killing, genocide, slavery, prolonged arbitrary detention and systematic racial 
discrimination”).  
 144. Id. at 1097. The court also states that “[a]lthough importing exhaustion may serve the 
cautious ends advocated in Sosa, opening the door through the [ATS] to other, nonsubstantive 
customary international law norms—such as universal jurisdiction—may be more problematic.” Id.  
 145. See id. at 1097–99 (discussing policy rationales for and against an exhaustion requirement). 
 146. See id. at 1098 (discussing whether local remedies would be improved by an exhaustion 
requirement).  
 147. See id. (stating that the improvement of local remedies remained “fairly speculative” and 
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exhaustion would put more pressure on foreign legal systems to improve 
because more international courts would pass judgment on rights-abusing 
defendants.148 The court concluded that policy rationales did not support 
implying an exhaustion element into the ATS without express direction 
from Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court.149  
The dissent declared that an exhaustion requirement should be read into 
the ATS.150 First, Judge Bybee stated that exhaustion, historically, was a 
judge-made rule used to provide autonomy to state courts or other 
branches of government.151 After concluding that exhaustion is a “‘rule of 
judicial administration’ . . . unless Congress directs otherwise,”152 Bybee 
determined that an exhaustion requirement best comported with 
Congressional intent.153  
The second portion of Bybee’s dissent discussed the legislative history 
of the TVPA, initially reasoning that “it makes little sense” for Congress 
to place heavier burdens on torture victims than those claiming relief 
under the ATS.154 With respect to the TVPA’s exhaustion requirement, 
Congress explained that exhaustion alleviated burdens on U.S. courts 
while ensuring that U.S. courts would not intrude on local remedies and 
that exhaustion “encourage[d] the development of meaningful remedies in 
other countries.”155 Absent any statement to the contrary, Bybee suggested 
that Congress did not intend to place greater demands on torture 
victims.156 Further, because the TVPA was created to clarify the ATS, the 
exhaustion requirement in the TVPA should be construed to clarify the 
 
 
“often lacks any empirical data . . .”). 
 148. See id. (discussing the theory that pressure would be put on local legal systems to protect 
human rights by foreign court rulings against defendants).  
 149. See id. at 1097–99 (discussing the dissent’s policy rationales and determining that courts 
should not import a “blanket exhaustion requirement” without “clear congressional guidance”).  
 150. Id. at 1100–22 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (discussing why exhaustion should be required).  
 151. See id. at 1101 (discussing the historical context of exhaustion requirements). The dissent 
stated that “[e]xhaustion was originally a judge-made rule . . . to prevent premature and unjustified 
interference in state proceedings.” Id. (citations omitted). Judge Bybee went on to explain that 
exhaustion was also required in order to “respect the processes afforded by a separate sovereign” and 
as “an expression of executive and administrative autonomy.” Id. at 1101–02 (citation omitted). 
 152. Id. at 1103 (quoting Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 518 (1982) (White, J., concurring 
in part) (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50 (1938))). Bybee also stated 
that “when Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs.” Id. 
(quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)).  
 153. Id. at 1103–06 (discussing the legislative history of the ATS and the TVPA).  
 154. Id. at 1103–04 (examining the TVPA’s legislative history due to the ATS’s lack of legislative 
history).  
 155. Id. at 1104 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 87–88). 
 156. See id. (stating that the court would have “expected Congress to comment on the new 
requirement”). 
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need for an exhaustion requirement within the ATS.157 Lastly, Bybee 
explained that the TVPA and ATS can best be harmonized by 
understanding that the ATS creates jurisdiction for substantive causes of 
action recognized by international law, and the TVPA is one of those 
substantive causes of action.158 Therefore, an element of the substantive 
causes of action recognized by the ATS is exhaustion.159  
Third, Bybee explained that U.S. and international law require 
exhaustion.160 Exhaustion “is a well-established principle of international 
law, recognized by courts and scholars both here and abroad.”161 Bybee 
cited examples, including the Jay Treaty, of when the United States 
recognized exhaustion as a principle of international law. He argued that 
these examples demonstrated that the United States expects exhaustion in 
other international contexts.162 Bybee also noted that international 
tribunals have “recognized and applied exhaustion, regardless of whether 
the principle has been called for in a formal agreement.”163 
Bybee then argued that legal minds are far from certain that exhaustion 
is procedural as opposed to substantive.164 He described three schools of 
thought: (1) international injury only occurs after exhausting the local 
legal system which affords no remedy, (2) exhaustion is a procedural bar 
to an international law claim, and (3) the procedural/substantive question 
depends on the facts of each case.165 Bybee concluded that regardless of 
the school of thought, exhaustion should be required because it is an 
established and settled norm of international law.166  
 
 
 157. See id. at 1105–06 (examining the rationale for creating the TVPA and determining that it 
“makes more sense to think that Congress codified the exhaustion requirement because it believed it 
was consistent with international law . . .”). 
 158. See id. at 1106 (examining the TVPA and the ATS and determining how best to harmonize 
the two types of statutes). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 1107 (“There is strong evidence that international law . . . recognizes exhaustion of 
remedies as a condition precedent to seeking relief before foreign and international tribunals.”). 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 1107–08 (discussing the Jay Treaty and other examples recognizing exhaustion as a 
principle of international law). Bybee also describes U.S. recognition in relation to Castro’s Cuba. Id. 
at 1108.  
 163. Id. Bybee states that the International Court of Justice “has recognized that the exhaustion 
requirement is so fundamental that, even where an international agreement fails to include the 
provision, it exists by default unless the agreement expressly states that exhaustion is not required.” Id. 
Bybee goes on to describe other examples of international tribunals that require exhaustion. Id. 
 164. See id. at 1109–10 (discussing the current debate on whether exhaustion is procedural or 
substantive).  
 165. See id. at 1110–11 (discussing the three schools of thought for the procedural/substantive 
question).  
 166. See id. at 1112 (concluding that though there is “no resolution to [the procedural/substantive] 
debate . . . [e]xhaustion . . . is an integral part of almost every claim in international law”).  
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Bybee further argued that exhaustion is a principle required by U.S. 
domestic law.167 He explained that exhaustion is essentially a conflicts of 
law rule that recognizes the sovereignty of foreign nations and respects the 
“foreign government’s ability to administer justice.”168 He next described 
how, like alternative dispute resolution, “exhaustion of remedies gives 
other countries the opportunity to address their own conflicts and craft 
their own solutions.”169 Lastly, Bybee stated that domestic administrative 
law requires exhaustion because proximity of evidence and legal expertise 
results in more accurate decisions.170 
Bybee also argued that an exhaustion requirement would better 
promote separation of powers within the U.S. government.171 He noted the 
semblance between exhaustion and the political question, comity, and act-
of-state doctrines, all of which respect the role of the executive and 
legislative branches in international affairs.172 He described how a case-
by-case analysis that does not require exhaustion (i.e., an analysis in which 
courts instead look to the executive branch for a determination of whether 
the case interferes with foreign affairs) would disturb the separation of 
powers by requiring “the judiciary to receive the Executive’s permission 
before invoking its jurisdiction.”173 Bybee concluded that an exhaustion 
requirement would help resolve separation of power issues in ATS cases 
by ensuring that litigants have not side-stepped their local judicial systems 
and by focusing the political issues in question.174 
V. ANALYSIS: EXHAUSTION SHOULD BE IMPORTED INTO THE ATS 
Both the majority and dissent in Sarei set forth formidable arguments 
regarding the importation of an exhaustion requirement into the ATS. I 
disagree with the majority, believing instead that factors tip the scales in 
favor of requiring exhaustion.175  
 
 
 167. See id. at 1114–22 (discussing exhaustion in U.S. domestic law). 
 168. See id. at 1115–16 (describing how exhaustion provides respect for foreign sovereigns).  
 169. Id. at 1116. Bybee described how exhaustion will promote “creation and refinement of local 
remedies,” including the creation of political solutions as opposed to litigation. Id. 
 170. See id. at 1118 (discussing the benefits of local tribunals adjudicating cases with injuries that 
took place within their borders).  
 171. See id. at 1118–19 (describing how exhaustion promotes the separation of power).  
 172. See id. at 1119 (discussing the doctrines which require respect for the political branches of 
government).  
 173. Id. at 1120 (quoting First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 
(1972)).  
 174. See id. at 1121 (describing the benefits of exhaustion on separation of power issues).  
 175. See id. at 1095 (stating that though the argument is close, the “balance tips against judicially 
engrafting an exhaustion requirement onto a statute where Congress has declined to do so . . .”). 
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First, Congress’s intent in creating the TVPA supports requiring 
exhaustion in the ATS. As stated in the Sarei dissent, it seems illogical for 
Congress to require exhaustion for torture victims and not for plaintiffs 
alleging violation of other international norms.176 Second, the TVPA is 
located within the historical notes of the ATS177 and is therefore codified 
within the ATS. Congress enacted the TVPA to expressly create a cause of 
action for torture victims178 and it seems unlikely that, as a clarifying 
addition to the ATS, the TVPA would restrict torture victims more than 
victims of other international torts actionable under the ATS. 
Following the Supreme Court’s cautionary advice in Sosa,179 courts 
should be careful to allow only a limited number of alien tort cases into 
U.S. courts. Requiring exhaustion seems more closely aligned with the 
Supreme Court’s high bar for allowing new causes of action under the 
ATS.180 Furthermore, the Supreme Court expressly advocated judicial 
interpretation of the ATS.181 Courts should, therefore, be able to import an 
exhaustion requirement into the ATS where Congress has not explicitly 
stated otherwise. 
The forum non conveniens cases also support placing an exhaustion 
requirement into the ATS. The analysis performed in these cases is very 
similar to that which would be performed if exhaustion were required by 
the ATS. Factors such as fairness to the foreign and domestic forums, and 
availability of evidence182 often weigh in favor of the victim exhausting 
local remedies before bringing suit in U.S. federal courts. Furthermore, the 
Adamu court’s statement that foreign plaintiffs should not be allowed 
greater deference in their choice of forum than U.S. citizens provides 
additional support for an exhaustion requirement.  
Finally, as discussed by the Ehanhoro Court and the Sarei dissent, 
exhaustion is a basic principle of international law.183 American courts 
should respect international legal systems by requiring alien tort plaintiffs 
to exhaust local remedies before allowing jurisdiction in U.S. courts. This 
requirement does not need to be overly burdensome on the plaintiffs. 
Courts must determine what the proper test for exhaustion in ATS cases 
 
 
 176. See supra Part IV and accompanying notes. 
 177. See supra Part I.B.1 and accompanying notes, discussing the legislative history of the TVPA.  
 178. See id. 
 179. See supra Part II.C and accompanying notes, discussing judicial caution recommended by the 
Sosa court. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text, analyzing the Sosa Court’s express advocacy 
of judicial interpretation with respect to the ATS.  
 182. See supra notes 59–89 and accompanying text, discussing the forum non conveniens analysis.  
 183. See supra notes 109 and 161 and accompanying text.  
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should be. An exhaustion requirement is consistent with the political 
question, act-of-state, and comity doctrines. It should be read into the text 
of the ATS, even absent express action by Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, foreign plaintiffs should be required to prove exhaustion 
of local remedies before bringing an ATS claim in U.S. federal courts. 
Though Congressional intent regarding the ATS is sparse, bordering on 
non-existent, the TVPA’s exhaustion requirement supports Congress’s 
assumption that a similar requirement should be read into the ATS. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court expressly limited causes of action falling 
under the ATS, a goal which is best served by requiring exhaustion. In 
addition, forum non conveniens analysis supports an exhaustion 
requirement. Lastly, basic principles of international law demand respect 
for international legal systems by requiring some exhaustion scrutiny 
before U.S. courts accept ATS cases. 
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